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POWER, PROCESS, AND AUTOMATED DECISION-
MAKING 
Ari Ezra Waldman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many decisions that used to be made by humans are now made by 
machines.  Automated decision-making algorithms1 evaluate teachers,2 
approve or reject loan applications,3 choose whom to search in an airport 
security line,4 allocate police officers on the beat,5 and determine eligibility 
for government benefits,6 among a litany of other commercial and 
government decisions. 
To some, this is cause for celebration.  Computers, the argument goes, are 
fast, powerful, and efficient and do not make the same mistakes as fallible, 
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entitled Rise of the Machines:  Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of 
Law, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Neuroscience and Law Center on February 
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Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword:  Rise of the Machines:  Artificial 
Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019). 
 
 1. In this Essay, I will use three phrases—“decision-making algorithms,” “automated 
decision-making,” “automated systems,” and derivations thereof—interchangeably to refer to 
the use of complex mathematical formulae to make commercial and social policy decisions. 
 2. See generally Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 3. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:  Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2017) (describing the use of algorithms in 
credit scoring). 
 4. See Notice of Modified Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security 
Transportation Security Administration—DHS/TSA—019 Secure Flight Records System of 
Records, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,270, 55,271 (Sept. 10, 2013) (“[T]he passenger prescreening 
computer system will conduct risk-based analysis of passenger data . . . .  TSA will then 
review this information using intelligence-driven, risk-based analysis to determine whether 
individual passengers will receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening . . . .”). 
 5. See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 
113–15 (2017) (describing predictive policing). 
 6. See generally MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 
18–22 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EFY-
2FJP]. 
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arbitrary, ill-informed, and biased humans.7  In fact, the opposite is true.  
Automated decision-making systems based on “big data”–powered 
algorithms and machine learning are just as prone to mistakes, biases, and 
arbitrariness as their human counterparts.8  In some ways, these automated 
tools are worse:  their opacity—even to experts, let alone ordinary citizens—
makes algorithmic decisions difficult to challenge and analyze.9  And the 
faith we tend to put in the power of technology shields algorithmic systems 
from critical interrogation, in general.10  The result is a technologically 
driven decision-making process that seems to defy interrogation, analysis, 
and accountability and, therefore, undermines due process.11  This should 
make algorithmic decision-making an illegitimate source of authority in a 
liberal democracy.12 
 
 7. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 389–95 (2015) (discussing some of the ways law enforcement can use 
large data sets to eliminate biases in policing); Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and 
the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1096–97 (2018) 
(noting that one of the “primary benefits of using predictive algorithms” is “their complete 
disregard of irrelevant subjective factors” like race, religion, what a person wears, how they 
conduct themselves in court, and so forth). 
 8. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1256 (2007) (citing the example of Colorado’s Benefit Management System, which 
issued “hundreds of thousands of incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility 
determinations . . . since its launch in September 2004”). 
 9. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:  THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 1–17 (2015) (describing the ways in which data analyses 
about consumers are hidden from view and from legal process). 
 10. See, e.g., Ewart J. de Visser et al., The World Is Not Enough:  Trust in Cognitive 
Agents, 56 HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y ANN. MEETING 263, 266–67 (2012); P. de 
Vries & C. Midden, Effect of Indirect Information on System Trust and Control Allocation, 27 
BEHAVIOUR & INFO. TECH. 17, 24, 27–28 (2008); Kevin Anthony Hoff & Masooda Bashir, 
Trust in Automation:  Integrating Empirical Evidence on Factors That Influence Trust, 57 
HUM. FACTORS 407, 413–15 (2015); Yung-Ming Li & Yung-Shao Yeh, Increasing Trust in 
Mobile Commerce Through Design Aesthetics, 26 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 673, 677–79 
(2010); Richard Pak et al., Decision Support Aids with Anthropomorphic Characteristics 
Influence Trust and Performance in Younger and Older Adults, 55 ERGONOMICS 1059, 1070–
71 (2012). 
 11. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1277, 1279 (2018). 
 12. There are various definitions of “legitimacy” in the philosophical, political science, 
and legal literatures.  For example, Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Mark C. 
Suchman, Managing Legitimacy:  Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 571, 574 (1995).  Tom Tyler, a law professor and political scientist, defines legitimacy 
as “perceived obligation to comply with the directives of an authority, irrespective of the 
personal gains.” TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27, 45 (1990).  A research agenda 
on the legitimacy of algorithmic decision-making must take a broad approach to the concept 
of legitimacy because the idea has traditionally been discussed in terms of authorities, 
individuals, or organizations.  Algorithmic legitimacy can be based on the legitimacy of the 
authority, private or public, using it or on the legitimacy of the decision-making process or on 
the decision itself.  Suchman’s broad definition, therefore, makes sense in this context.  As 
such, I define legitimacy as the socially constructed propriety of authority to make decisions 
for others. 
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The question, then, is this:  can systems that evade traditional modalities 
of accountability ever be legitimate?  Perhaps they can’t.  Automating 
decisions about commercial and social goods may be at odds with important 
democratic values like equality, fairness, and human flourishing, whatever 
the benefits of computational efficiency may be.  We see this approach, for 
example, in the rapidly spreading bans on the use of facial recognition 
technology.13 
Or, as many scholars argue,14 perhaps we can leverage process and 
procedure to put guardrails around automated decision-making systems.  
This approach makes some sense.  In his seminal study of legal legitimacy, 
Tom Tyler showed that popular perceptions of legitimacy and, in turn, a 
general willingness to accept the decisions of authorities hinge, at least in 
part, on the existence of procedural safeguards and the opportunity to be 
heard.15  In other words, legitimacy of legal authorities depends on process.  
This Essay challenges the application of this approach to automated decision-
making. 
Using algorithms to make commercial and social decisions is really a story 
about power, the people who have it, and how it affects the rest of us.  Seen 
in this way, the project to limit individual and social harms caused by 
algorithms is different than scholars have so far presumed.  In this Essay, I 
argue that algorithmic decision-making systems are social, political, and 
economic expressions of what Julie Cohen and others have called neoliberal 
managerialization, or an organizational system of public or private 
governance that prioritizes freedom and efficiency above all other values.16  
Engineers, most of whom are heterosexual, white men,17 control the process 
by which decision-making policy is translated into decision-making code.18  
 
 13. See Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial 
Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/ 
us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/H2MP-ELVM]; see also 
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression, 
MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-
for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/S43S-DVZG]. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See TYLER, supra note 12, at 96, 116–20, 137–38, 149.  The effect of fair procedure 
on legitimacy is more pronounced in contexts where procedure matters more, like a trial. Id. 
at 105. 
 16. See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 7, 139–141, 143–46 (2019); see also LAUREN B. EDELMAN, 
WORKING LAW:  COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 124–50 (2016) 
(showing how form over substance in corporate compliance with civil rights law was having 
a deleterious effect on real progress on workplace equality). 
 17. See Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-
white-guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/J3G7-Z4WE]; Karen Hao, AI’s White Guy 
Problem Isn’t Going Away, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 17, 2019), https:// 
www.technologyreview.com/s/613320/ais-white-guy-problem-isnt-going-away/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XCQ-B32Q]. 
 18. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659 
(2018) (describing how engineering control over the design process gives them power to 
determine the extent to which new technology designs protect privacy); see also WOODROW 
HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT:  THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW 
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And they exercise that power for corporate interests seeking greater 
efficiency under a deceptive discourse of neutrality and professional 
distance.19  In other words, algorithmic decision-making hides the fact that 
engineers and their corporate employers are choosing winners and losers 
while steadfastly remaining agnostic about the social, political, and economic 
consequences of their work.  This is neoliberalism at its worst. 
In this context, applying process-oriented solutions to algorithmic 
overreach won’t work.  The managerial ethos inside corporations operating 
in a permissive, neoliberal regulatory environment will twist process to serve 
corporate ends.20  As such, regulators must go beyond process to rebalance 
the structures of power.  Society should adopt normative or substantive 
mandates that all government and private automated decision-making must 
follow.  Critically, evidence of achieving those normative goals cannot be 
limited to procedures put in place in their name, whether they be impact 
assessments, audits, or checklists.21  Evidence of algorithmic systems 
adhering to social values must come from independent interrogation of the 
model for noncompliance.  We need to learn to audit the code, and legal rules 
must evolve to allow it.  If these algorithms fail independent tests, they should 
be considered illegitimate in any liberal democratic society and not deployed. 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly describes and critiques the 
use of algorithmic systems to make decisions about us.  This Part argues that 
the very elements that make algorithms so attractive to decision makers also 
make them illegitimate in a democratic society.  Part II reviews existing 
proposals to rein in algorithmic decision-making, ultimately arguing that, in 
both theory and practice, neoliberal managerialization both creates the case 
for automated decision-making and undermines process-oriented forms of 
accountability.  This Part concludes with a substantive approach to regulating 
algorithmic decision-making systems in society.  The Essay concludes with 
avenues for future research. 
I.  ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Automated decision-making systems use complex mathematical 
algorithms to identify meaningful relationships and likely patterns in large 
data sets.22  For example, an algorithm can analyze diverse factors, including 
internet browsing behavior, purchase history, residence zip code, 
employment, educational achievement, salary, and family relationships, 
 
TECHNOLOGIES 21–55 (2018) (recognizing the importance technology design plays in user 
autonomy or lack thereof). 
 19. See Waldman, supra note 18, at 681–96. 
 20. See EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 124–50 (discussing how compliance professionals 
inside corporations leveraged process and procedure to protect the company rather than 
achieve equality pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 21. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3, 64), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3339372 [https://perma.cc/SVN5-8R5B] (showing that privacy protections can be 
undermined by process-oriented approaches to compliance). 
 22. See Berman, supra note 11, at 1279. 
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among myriad other variables, to predict the likelihood that someone with a 
particular collection of characteristics will be a productive employee, a good 
credit risk, an effective leader, or a qualified recipient of health care.23  
Humans may be able to roughly and imperfectly extrapolate leadership 
potential from a history of leadership on a resume or from an interview, but 
computers can both process more input variables and find unexpected 
relationships between inputs and dependent variables that humans could 
not.24  That’s what makes algorithmic decision-making so enticing to both 
public and private policymakers. 
A growing literature explores some of the sociopolitical concerns with 
deploying automated systems to make decisions about our lives, particularly 
in the context of commerce, social policy, and criminal justice.25  Indeed, the 
very characteristics that make automated decision-making systems so 
attractive—predictive abilities, complexity, power, and independence—are 
also what make them so problematic for the rule of law and legal legitimacy.  
Proposals aimed at making algorithms accountable to the law are attempts to 
address these problems.  And yet, as I will show in the next section, the 
proposals are bandages that ignore the underlying incompatibility between 
algorithmic decision-making and a society based on normative values like 
equality and fairness. 
A.  Predictions and Probabilities 
Algorithms cannot predict the future.  They can, however, estimate the 
probability that something will happen based on existing data.26  That is, 
algorithms cannot know for sure that a loan applicant will pay back her loan 
 
 23. For a more detailed discussion of how algorithms function on large data sets, please 
see Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:  Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014). See also FTC, BIG DATA:  
A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 1 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-
data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PTZ-ATHW]. 
 24. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing With the Data:  What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 666–71 (2017). 
 25. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH:  THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT 
YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 173 (2015) (noting that data is being collected to 
serve corporate and government ends); Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough:  
Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 555, 
621–24 (2014) (arguing that law enforcement’s use of location tracking could violate the 
Fourth Amendment); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, ”Plausible Cause”:  Explanatory Standards in 
the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1255–57 (2017) (challenging the use 
of algorithmic decision-making in the law enforcement context); Citron & Pasquale, supra 
note 3, at 4 (discussing how bias is embedded in algorithmic systems); see also Julia Angwin 
et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/4A9L-MLBW] (showing racial bias in an algorithm used to predict 
recidivism). 
 26. See Bellovin et al., supra note 25, at 590 (“Machine learning works best when given 
a large training set of observations (ideally drawn in some independent manner) with which it 
estimates models.  These models are then used to make predictions on future data outputting 
a probability measure for the occurrence of an event or existence of a fact.”). 
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in time; they can only conclude that a certain mix of factors creates some 
probability that a result will happen.  Like statistical analysis, then, 
automated decision-making systems will make mistakes.  False negatives and 
misinterpretations will happen.  Consider one popular example:  researchers 
trained a machine to differentiate between images of dogs and wolves by 
feeding it images they had manually labeled “dog” and “wolf.”  The program 
correctly classified many new images, but rather than learning about dogs 
and wolves, it found patterns that differentiated the pictures generally, 
particularly the presence of snow and trees.  Wolves are far more likely than 
dogs to be found in the snow, so the algorithm identified all pictures with 
snow as “wolf.”27 
Sometimes, these mistakes can have real effects on the ground.  In 2017, 
Amazon’s algorithm mistakenly recommended bomb-making products to be 
sold together.28  Cancer victims have been erroneously denied benefits and 
have had to sue insurance companies for their due.29  Welfare recipients have 
been stripped of entitlements.30  Citizens have been placed on government 
watch lists for no reason other than an error in an automated system.31  Small 
mistakes can result in significant deprivation and harm, calling into question 
the extent to which algorithms can make fair, predictable decisions. 
B.  Complexity and Opacity 
Mistakes are not the only threat to algorithmic legitimacy in a society that 
values the rule of law.  As algorithms become more accurate and better 
predictors, they also become more complex and, therefore, more opaque and 
resistant to interrogation.32  Automated decision-making systems are “black 
boxes”;33 even experts may not fully understand how inputs become 
outputs.34  Algorithms are either intentionally kept secret, whether as 
 
 27. See Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, “Why Should I Trust 
You?”:  Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, 22 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. 
ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 1135, 1142 (2016). 
 28. See Paul Sandle, Amazon Reviewing Website After Algorithm Suggests Bomb-Making 
Ingredients, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-
security-amazon-com/amazon-reviewing-website-after-algorithm-suggests-bomb-making-
ingredients-idUSKCN1BV1WK [https://perma.cc/K3TH-EAKY]. 
 29. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY:  HOW HIGH-TECH 
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018). 
 30. See Scarlet Wilcock, Policing Welfare:  Risk, Gender and Criminality, 5 INT’L J. FOR 
CRIME JUST. & SOC. DEM. 113, 114–15 (2016). 
 31. See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2016). 
 32. See, e.g., Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling:  The Two Cultures, 16 STAT. SCI. 199, 
206–08 (2001) (noting the trade-off between the accuracy and functionality of an algorithm, 
on the one hand, and the capacity of humans to understand how it works, on the other). 
 33. See PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 1–17. 
 34. See Edward K. Cheng, Being Pragmatic About Forensic Linguistics, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 
541, 548 (2013). 
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proprietary trade secrets35 or in order to prevent gaming,36 or they are 
functionally opaque because of the “specialized knowledge” required to 
understand their source code.37  Either way, the opacity of decision-making 
algorithms prevents those harmed by automated systems from determining 
either how a decision came about or the logic and reasoning behind it.38  This 
makes accountability difficult. 
C.  Power and Privacy 
Another advantage of automated decision-making is that algorithms can 
consider a multitude of factors—far more than humans39—when analyzing 
enormous data sets and, therefore, find unexpected correlations between 
independent and dependent variables.40  Algorithms powered by machine 
learning can also learn from experience and make even more accurate 
probabilistic determinations over time.41  This may be an algorithm’s chief 
advantage:  it can do things with numbers that humans can’t. 
But algorithms’ superhuman power to process and find unexpected insight 
in raw data also makes them privacy invasive and, arguably, inconsistent with 
democratic principles of autonomy, dignity, and choice.  As the computer 
scientist Steve Bellovin has explained, “[m]achine learning algorithms are 
able to deduce information—including information that has no obvious 
linkage to the input data—that may otherwise have remained private due to 
the natural limitations of manual and human-driven investigation.”42  That 
can result in the revelation of intimate information, from membership in a 
protected class to an underage pregnancy.43  It also undermines the obscurity 
 
 35. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that algorithms are “shrouded in 
secrecy”).  See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets:  Intellectual 
Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2017) (describing how trade 
secrecy impacts the criminal justice system). 
 36. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that policies for algorithmic 
transparency should consider the potential for gaming).  This concern is exaggerated. See 
Ignacio N. Cofone & Katherine J. Strandburg, Strategic Games and Algorithmic Secrecy, 
MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 38–39), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440878 [https://perma.cc/95B8-E944] (arguing that the likelihood 
of gaming is dependent on social costs and, thus, far less likely than scholars have assumed). 
 37. See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable 
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1092–94 (2018) (arguing that understanding machine 
learning algorithms takes “specialized knowledge” and even with that knowledge, the basis of 
a decision is often still inscrutable). 
 38. Id. at 1099–101. 
 39. See, e.g., Graeme S. Halford et al., How Many Variables Can Humans Process?, 16 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 70, 70, 75–76 (2005) (finding that human processing maxes out at four 
variables). 
 40. See Andrej Zwitter, Big Data Ethics, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2014, at 1, 3–4. 
 41. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014) 
(explaining how machine learning can make algorithms capable of adapting “to enhance their 
performance on some task through experience”). 
 42. Bellovin et al., supra note 25, at 558. 
 43. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R4JU-GN3C] (describing Target’s pregnancy prediction score). 
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we come to expect in modern society44 and allows data collectors to develop 
eerily precise virtual portraits of consumers for the purposes of behavioral 
targeting and manipulation through “dark patterns.”45  And none of these 
concerns can be alleviated by a promise to delete personally identifiable 
information (PII) because algorithmic systems can uses proxies for PII or 
develop PII from innocuous raw data.46 
Therefore, automated decision-making represents a radical shift in the 
discourse of power.  Language, Foucault argued, shapes our understanding 
and perceptions of legitimacy and legality.47  Critical race theorists and 
feminist scholars have made similar arguments about the power of speech.48  
Similarly when the language we use to talk about and implement privacy 
changes, so too does the locus of power over privacy.  Through the noise of 
a diverse privacy discourse,49 the language and assumptions about privacy 
have always been accessible to consumers:  we talk about privacy in terms 
of “anonymity,”50 greater “control” over our information,51 barriers and 
 
 44. See HARTZOG, supra note 18, at 10–11; Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The 
Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2013). 
 45. “Dark patterns” are design tricks that manipulate user behavior in predetermined 
ways. See, e.g., Saul Greenberg et al., Dark Patterns in Proxemic Interactions:  A Critical 
Perspective, 2014 PROC. CONF. ON DESIGNING INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS 523, 524; Arunesh 
Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale:  Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 
PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION (forthcoming Nov. 2019), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TTJ-W743].  One example of a dark pattern is 
PayPal’s alleged use of various website design features to trick users into signing up for a 
PayPal credit card when they thought they were using their preexisting PayPal account. See 
Complaint at 7–8, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. PayPal, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01426 (D. Md. 
May 19, 2015), ECF No. 1. 
 46. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:  Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (noting that it is impossible for perfectly 
anonymous data to have any marketable uses). 
 47. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (Robert Hurley trans., 
Pantheon Books ed. 1978) (1976) (noting that “[d]iscourse transmits and produces power”); 
Gerald Turkel, Michel Foucault:  Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 170, 172 
(1990) (describing Foucault’s argument on “discourses of domination”); see also Richard K. 
Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance:  A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 749–824 (1988) (using case law on confessions to note a change in 
power dynamics). 
 48. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go:  Regulating Racist Speech 
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444; see also MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND 
DISTRUST:  WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 79–105 (1996) (arguing that Foucault’s 
discourse of power is fundamentally a gendered dynamic); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 61 (1991) (noting that the legacy of slavery is entrenched by 
“powerful and invisibly reinforcing structures of thought, language, and law”). 
 49. See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:  INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 13–45 (2018) (grouping seemingly conflicting visions of privacy into 
negative and positive conceptions); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 14–
36 (2008) (reviewing some of the many different definitions of privacy). 
 50. This is particularly helpful for members of marginalized and stigmatized 
communities. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 
162 (2015) (arguing that privacy should be understood as preventing intimate information 
from serving as the basis of discrimination). 
 51. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992) (defining 
privacy as “control over a realm of intimacy”); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 
(1967) (defining privacy as the freedom to make individual disclosure choices); Steve 
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separation,52 solitude,53 and trust.54  Shifting that discourse into the language 
of technology—namely, code55—empowers the technologists and 
technology companies that control means of policymaking on the ground.  
Where a society uses code to determine winners and losers, the discourse of 
law becomes the discourse of engineering.  This disempowers consumers, 
who have no access to a technology-driven privacy discourse, and again 
delegitimizes automated decision-making in a democratic society.56 
D.  Independence and Bias 
Finally, automated decision-making systems not only have the capacity to 
do more than humans ever could, they also supposedly remove humans and 
their biases from decision-making processes.  But the mathematical system 
analyzing the data is agnostic about the value of the underlying data.  In other 
words, algorithmic decision-making systems do not ignore biased data, they 
end up cementing those biases in society.  The racial,57 gender,58 and 
 
Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351, 351 (2010) (defining privacy 
as making the choice to “control” and “manage” the boundary between ourselves and others). 
 52. See, e.g., CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 8 (2010) (arguing that 
privacy can be subjective and, for some, only attained when they go “off the grid”); Robert S. 
Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue:  A Multidimensional 
Developmental Theory, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 22, 23 (1977) (identifying “separation from the 
collective” as a source of privacy); Jeffrey Rosen, Out of Context:  The Purposes of Privacy, 
68 SOC. RES. 209, 217 (2001) (describing privacy as a “shield”); Edward Shils, Privacy:  Its 
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1966) (describing 
“private life” as a “secluded life”). 
 53. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 196 (1890). 
 54. See WALDMAN, supra note 49, at 51–52 (noting that trust allows us to share because 
it creates expectations of confidentiality and adherence to norms). 
 55. Some scholars note that the discourse of artificial intelligence is inherently hidden 
from us. See, e.g., Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering:  Beyond 
Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 186–90 (2017) (discussing the 
limits of transparency in algorithmic systems); see also Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Keynote Address Before the Coalition for Networked Information:  Transparency, 
Trust, and Consumer Protection in a Complex World 8–9 (Dec. 15, 2015), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/895843/151216cnikeynote.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K82R-9G4S] (noting difficulties in making algorithms transparent and 
calling on companies to address fairness themselves). 
 56. See generally Waldman, supra note 21. 
 57. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 712 (2016) (discussing how zip codes can serve as a proxy for race, thus 
embedding race discrimination in an algorithmic system). 
 58. See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s 
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 609 (2018) (discussing examples of gender bias 
in algorithmic systems); see also David Meyer, Amazon Reportedly Killed an AI Recruitment 
System Because It Couldn’t Stop the Tool from Discriminating Against Women, FORTUNE 
(Oct. 10, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10/10/amazon-ai-recruitment-bias-women-sexist/ 
[https://perma.cc/79J7-J7XP]; Noam Scheiber, Facebook Accused of Allowing Bias Against 
Women in Job Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/ 
18/business/economy/facebook-job-ads.html [https://perma.cc/HUS2-S5YK]; Tom Simonite, 
Machines Taught by Photos Learn a Sexist View of Women, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/machines-taught-by-photos-learn-a-sexist-view-of-women/ 
[https://perma.cc/EXJ4-U34L]. 
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socioeconomic59 biases of algorithmic systems are particularly rich areas of 
research and popular reporting.  That important work need not be repeated 
here.  Suffice it to say, algorithmic systems are only as good as the data on 
which they are based.  An algorithm can be used to predict recidivism rates 
among criminals, but if the inputs are biased against persons of color, the 
algorithms will overestimate the recidivism risk of black people and 
underestimate the risks for white people.60  Similarly, a predictive language 
algorithm can anticipate the probability that certain words will be used in 
tandem—like “Paris” and “France” will likely be paired as often as “Seoul” 
will be paired with “South Korea”—but associate “man” with “doctor” and 
“woman” with “homemaker” because the underlying data on which the 
algorithm was based reflected society’s biases about gender.61  Coupled with 
our tendency to trust the neutrality and accuracy of computers far more than 
that of humans,62 the biases of automated decision-making systems powered 
by artificial intelligence can entrench second-class citizenship for 
marginalized populations. 
II.  PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE:  RESPONDING TO THE THREATS OF 
ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING 
Scholars and advocates have recognized the threat that automated 
decision-making systems pose to the rule of law.  As such, a variety of 
proposals seek to fabricate a regulatory regime for seemingly unaccountable 
algorithms.  But their breadth belies one overarching trend:  they all use 
process and procedure to achieve their goal.  In this Part, I describe some of 
those proposals and argue that because both algorithmic decision-making and 
faith in process emerge from the same neoliberal ethos, many of the proposals 
under discussion today will fail to address the underlying social and political 
dangers algorithms pose to society. 
A.  Process-Oriented Proposals 
Danielle Keats Citron was among the first to call for replacing old forms 
of adjudication and rulemaking with reconceived systems that include audit 
trails, education for hearing officers on machine fallibility, detailed 
explanations, publicly accessible code, and systems testing, among other 
recommendations.63  Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas argue that a right to 
explanation of automated decisions entitles individuals to clarity about the 
 
 59. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION:  HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 7 (2016); Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, 
and Big Data:  A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 77, 
97 (2017).  See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017). 
 60. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 25. 
 61. This example comes from Levendowski, supra note 58, at 580–81. 
 62. See, e.g., de Vries & Midden, supra note 10, at 18–19; Hoff & Bashir, supra note 10, 
at 420; Poornima Madhavan & Douglas A. Wiegmann, Effects of Information Source, 
Pedigree, and Reliability on Operator Interaction with Decision Support Systems, 49 HUM. 
FACTORS 773, 777 (2007). 
 63. See Citron, supra note 8, at 1305–13. 
2019] AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING 623 
process behind a model’s development.64  Dillon Reisman, Jason Schultz, 
Kate Crawford, and Meredith Whittaker of the AI Now Institute recommend 
algorithmic impact assessments, modeled after environmental or privacy 
impact assessments,65 to document and assess a system’s fairness.66  Tal 
Zarsky suggests that greater transparency would help because anyone 
adversely affected by an algorithmic decision maker has a dignitary right to 
“understand why.”67  Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy, and Alice 
Marwick call for procedural safeguards to prevent algorithmic-based 
discrimination against the poor.68  Sonia Katyal recommends codes of 
conduct, impact assessments, and whistleblower protections to alleviate bias 
problems.69  Joshua Kroll and a team of researchers argue that technological 
tools can weed out biases from within.70  Margot Kaminski suggests that the 
General Data Protection Regulation71 (GDPR), Europe’s comprehensive 
data privacy legislation, can offer robust protection from harms stemming 
from automated decision-making because it entitles data subjects to 
explanations about the “logic” behind any algorithmic system.72  A. Michael 
Froomkin and Meg Leta Jones, among other scholars, have called for keeping 
humans in the loop to act as a check on automation running amok.73  And 
Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale argue that the “right to be forgotten,” data 
 
 64. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 37, at 1087. 
 65. See Selbst, supra note 5, at 175, 184, 188 (discussing impact assessments in the 
environmental context). 
 66. DILLON REISMAN ET AL., AI NOW INST., ALGORITHMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENTS:  A 
PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2018), https:// 
ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ4Q-BHLS] (stating that “[p]ublic 
agencies urgently need a practical framework to assess automated decision systems and to 
ensure public accountability”). 
 67. See Tal Zarsky, Transparency in Data Mining:  From Theory to Practice, in 
DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 301, 317 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 
2013). 
 68. See Madden et al., supra note 59, at 113–22. 
 69. See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 54, 107–28 (2019). 
 70. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 662–72, 
682–92 (2017). 
 71. See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 72. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 189, 199 (2019). 
 73. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform 
Doctors:  Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 
61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 34 (2019) (arguing that health algorithms without humans in the loop 
would decrease care quality); Stephen E. Henderson, A Few Criminal Justice Big Data Rules, 
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 527, 533–34 (2018) (proposing that a human should always be the 
ultimate decision maker when algorithms are deployed in the criminal justice system); Meg 
Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop:  Political Constructions of Computer 
Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 217 (2017) (couching the “human in 
the loop” mandate as based on European respect for human dignity). 
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protection impact assessments, and certifications and privacy seals can help 
make algorithms more accountable.74 
All of these proposals have one thing in common:  they use procedural 
guardrails to prophylactically shoehorn algorithmic decision-making into an 
accountability regime.  The approach makes some sense; procedure has, after 
all, been called the “essence” of due process rights.75  The opportunity to be 
heard by an impartial adjudicator is central to legitimate democratic 
authority.76  And in order to hold someone responsible or liable for 
intentional or negligent harm or failures in design, common law 
accountability regimes need to know what happened, what steps were taken 
to avoid causing harm, and what was reasonable under the circumstances.  
Procedural requirements like algorithmic impact assessments, source code 
transparency, explanations of either the result or the logic behind it, and a 
human in the loop who can hear someone’s appeal move opaque automated 
systems closer to more familiar, and more accountable, decision-making 
regimes. 
B.  The Neoliberal Project of Algorithmic Decision-Making 
But that will not solve the problem.  Transparency, impact assessments, 
paper trails, and the traditional accountability mechanisms they support do 
not address the gaps in the underlying social and political system that not 
only lays the groundwork for algorithmic decision-making but sees its 
proliferation, despite its biases, errors, and harms, as a good thing.  The 
central legitimacy problem of automated decision-making systems is not that 
they are more opaque, complex, or biased than humans.  If that were the 
issue, accountability regimes that work for human decision makers would, 
with some modifications, work for algorithms. 
Rather, algorithmic decision-making represents a distinctly neoliberal 
form of policymaking that is, both doctrinally and as a matter of practice, 
agnostic about its sociopolitical and economic implications.  Its emphasis on 
efficiency tilts the scales toward machines over humans and undermines the 
effectiveness of procedural guardrails to ensure accountability.  For any 
society that cares about values like fairness, nondiscrimination, and human 
rights, algorithmic decision-making is presumptively illegitimate until it can 
be shown to reflect more than just neoliberal values of innovation and 
efficiency.  To do that, we must learn to audit the code and not simply be 
satisfied with compliance procedures. 
 
 74. See Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm?:  Why a ‘Right to an 
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
18, 67–80 (2017). 
 75. See Citron, supra note 8, at 1255. 
 76. See TYLER, supra note 12, at 96, 116–20, 137–38, 149. 
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1.  The Neoliberal Crusade for Efficiency 
Neoliberalism is a political philosophy that aims to replace and undermine 
a political system based on social justice and social welfare with a regime 
that is “characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, 
unencumbered markets, and free trade.”77  Its proponents argue that 
neoliberalism maximizes personal well-being by fostering the ability of 
individuals to choose their version of the good life.78  The practical 
manifestation of this philosophy is a political and economic system where 
organizations, both governmental and commercial, prioritize efficiency and 
market solutions to social problems.  Neoliberal trade policy, for example, is 
characterized by low or no tariffs and the free movement of goods and 
services, likely without the friction of worker and environmental 
protections;79 neoliberal free speech policy is deregulated and based on the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor rather than concern for social justice and 
marginalized populations.80  In a similar vein, neoliberal organizational 
policy is managerial, or streamlined for the purposes of fostering efficiency, 
innovation, and profit over other values.81  Managerial policies include 
anything that would amplify efficiency in the means of production, whether 
that is eliminating the likelihood of expensive litigation, erasing cost centers, 
or outsourcing tasks to more efficient entities.82 
This is where algorithmic decision-making comes in and why it is a natural 
outgrowth of a neoliberal philosophy.  A political system that wants to 
prioritize efficiency, agility, and nimble economic action over social justice 
is a natural ally of professionals, like computer scientists and computer 
engineers, whose traditional “cardinal virtue” is efficiency.83  It makes sense, 
then, that neoliberal leaders would turn to engineers to make policymaking 
 
 77. David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 22–23.  In this respect, neoliberalism is based, in part, on Rawlian, neo-Kantian 
theory. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (using Kantian rationality to 
develop a system of justice for a multicultural society). 
 79. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521–27 (2000) (noting that it is “well established” that the dominant 
neoliberal free trade regime promotes social welfare). 
 80. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism:  Lochnerism for a New 
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 198–203 (2014) (describing neoliberal 
interpretations of constitutional provisions); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. 
REV. 133, 145 (chronicling a corporate social movement to interpret the First Amendment in 
line with neoliberal, libertarian ideas). 
 81. See Gerard Hanlon, The First Neo-Liberal Science:  Management and Neo-
Liberalism, 52 SOCIOLOGY 298, 309–11 (2016); see also COHEN, supra note 16, at 145 (noting 
that “[n]eoliberal managerialism does not value bureaucracy but rather efficient administration 
of lean and nimble production”). 
 82. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 144–57 (discussing outsourcing, forced arbitration, and 
the elimination of opportunities for plaintiffs to obtain justice in the courts as part of the 
managerial project). 
 83. Paul Ohm & Jonathan Frankle, Desirable Inefficiency, 70 FLA. L. REV. 777, 786 
(2016).  Ohm and Frankle also note that software engineers and computer scientists are 
increasingly being asked to consider other values in their work. See id. at 778–81. 
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more efficient.84  Similarly, corporations influenced by neoliberal 
managerialism outsource to technology any activities that their human 
employees either do poorly or inefficiently.85  For both reasons, then, 
automated decision-making systems seem attractive.  Asking an algorithm to 
decide police allocation, jail time, or benefit entitlements reflects 
neoliberalism’s underlying philosophical and political orientation toward 
deregulation, nonintervention, and efficiency.  For profit-maximizing 
corporations looking to cut costs, replacing humans with mechanical decision 
makers makes sense from financial and efficiency perspectives as well. 
2.  Neoliberalism and the Power of Engineers 
Algorithmic decision-making is, therefore, a natural outgrowth of 
neoliberal managerialism in the public and private sectors.  This creates 
systemic problems for algorithmic legitimacy.  Most notably, important 
social values like fairness, equality, nondiscrimination, accountability, 
fundamental human rights, and the extent to which society cares about the 
vulnerable and marginalized are absent from this narrative.  This is the result 
of both doctrine and practice. 
Neoliberalism assesses success or failure on the metrics and values of the 
market and, therefore, elides other normative social values by recasting or 
redefining them.  Consider equality.  Those who share a robust concept of 
equality recognize the obvious gap between formal law and life on the 
ground—where a law that, say, mandates nondiscrimination on the basis of 
race or gender fails to address the systemic burdens faced by marginalized 
populations and the hurdles they must jump over to achieve the same level 
of success as straight, white men.  Neoliberalism recasts the project of 
equality to erase this problem.  For neoliberals, equality is about equal 
opportunity or choice, and any gap between neoliberal equality and social 
practice is not the fault of the system but the fault of the individual.  In the 
context of algorithmic decision-making, neoliberalism conceptualizes 
equality in terms of equal opportunity,86 which is something machines do 
quite well.  Computers neither know nor care if someone is black or brown 
or gay or transgender.  Everyone is a number or a series of inputs, and code 
does not discriminate.  This, of course, is a myth.  As noted earlier, automated 
decision-making systems embed the biases of their inputs into their 
probabilistic determinations, cementing implicit and explicit prejudice in 
society.87  As a result, true social equality is lost. 
 
 84. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 140 (bringing technology into government reflects the 
managerial ethos).  We see this reflected in society and politics as well, where candidates for 
office highlight their corporate experience as a virtue, vow to cut “red tape,” and, at least in 
one instance, call themselves “the first MBA president.” See James P. Pfiffner, The First MBA 
President:  George W. Bush as a Public Administrator, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 6, 7 (2007). 
 85. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 156 (outsourcing to technology represents a focus on 
efficient management). 
 86. See Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT 
REV. 97, 99, 108–11 (2009) (critiquing the feminist movement’s slide toward neoliberalism). 
 87. See supra Part I.D. 
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Moreover, as a matter of social practice, algorithmic decision-making 
empowers engineers to make policy decisions, embedding their ingrained 
commitment to efficiency and their indifference to privacy and other social 
values in society.  Engineers are the ones responsible for shoehorning policy 
into codable algorithms,88 a translation process that will necessarily edit out 
the flexibility and contextualism that gives decision-making standards 
advantages over bright-line rules.89  As such, a design team becomes the 
locus at which law is interpreted, negotiated, and transformed into actionable 
tools.90  This gives engineers enormous power, both to choose winners and 
losers and decide what the law will mean in practice.91  And engineers 
leverage this power while professing that they and their designs are value-
neutral.  The law and technology scholar Frank Pasquale has noted that, even 
when programmers create tools that have evident racial biases—like a search 
engine that shows racially stereotyped advertisements92—the designers cast 
the technology as a “cultural voting machine, merely registering, rather than 
creating, perceptions.”93  Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz have described 
engineers as inadequately fluent in the language of public policy; as one 
programmer told them, “we can make stuff work—it’s not our job to figure 
out if it’s right or not.  We often don’t know.”94  And elsewhere, I have 
described how some engineers, at least in the high technology sector, resist 
the notion that designing for privacy or safety is part of their job or even 
possible under the demanding circumstances in which they work.95  
Therefore, when policy decisions are made by engineers, nonengineering 
values may get short shrift. 
 
 88. See Berman, supra note 11, at 1329–30. 
 89. Discussions about the relative merits of rules versus flexible standards are beyond the 
scope of this Essay.  Duncan Kennedy originally described rules and standards as setting up a 
dialectical form of argument. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1689–90 (1976).  Ronald Dworkin emphasized the role 
that standards play in realizing substantive legal principles. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The 
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967) (distinguishing between principles and 
rules in order to explain the important role of standards that are not rules); see also, e.g., MARK 
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); RICHARD POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42–53 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 596–99 
(1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383–420 (1985) 
(examining the form and rhetoric of the rules versus standards debate). 
 90. See generally Waldman, supra note 18. 
 91. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Outsourcing Privacy (May 20, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that engineers at privacy technology vendors code 
their interpretations of legal privacy requirements into technological tools). 
 92. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMMS. ACM, May 
2013, at 44, 46–47, 50–51. 
 93. PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 39. 
 94. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 23, at 105. 
 95. See Waldman, supra note 18, at 686–89. 
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3.  The Failure of Process 
Neoliberalism also explains why process-oriented accountability 
proposals will fail.  In the neoliberal system that created algorithmic 
decision-making, accountability is recast as compliance, which can 
undermine the power of procedure to rein in automated decision-making in 
two ways. 
First, procedure can be co-opted by corporate interests.  According to the 
sociologist and legal scholar Lauren Edelman, the managerial law inside a 
corporation involves shifting the site at which law is interpreted and 
negotiated from policymakers and courts to corporate compliance procedures 
and internal structures designed to signify superficial legal adherence to 
regulations.96  When that happens, procedural requirements can be co-opted 
to serve corporate, rather than consumer, interests.  Edelman calls this the 
“mobilization of symbolic structures.”97 
In her book, Working Law, Edelman describes how some legal regimes 
characterized by vague requirements and process-oriented safe harbors give 
compliance professionals on the ground the opportunity to frame the law in 
accordance with managerial values like operational efficiency and reducing 
corporate risk rather than the substantive goals the law is meant to achieve, 
like consumer protection or equality.98  This opens the door for companies to 
create structures, policies, and protocols that comply with the law in name 
only.99  As these symbolic structures become more common, judges and 
policymakers defer to them as paradigms of best practices, mistaking mere 
symbols of compliance with adherence with legal mandates.100  When this 
happens, law fails to achieve substantive goals because the compliance 
metric—the adoption of symbols, processes, procedures, and policies within 
a corporate environment—can be orthogonal to actual progress.  Edelman 
discussed legal endogeneity in the context of race and sex discrimination in 
the workplace, where the equality goals of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 were being frustrated by the ineffectual trainings, toothless policies, 
checklists, and disempowered diversity offices that compliance professionals 
created on the ground.101  Elsewhere, I have shown how this process is 
undermining the promised protections of data privacy laws, as well.102 
Even rules that mandate that all automated decision-making systems treat 
all individuals equally and fairly, but use process and procedure to do it, are 
likely to fall victim to the same phenomenon.  Algorithmic impact 
assessments can identify and evaluate risks, consider alternatives, identify 
strategies to mitigate risks, and help articulate the rationale for the automated 
 
 96. See EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 100–50. 
 97. Id. at 153–55. 
 98. Id. at 3–15. 
 99. Id. at 14. 
 100. Id. at 12–13. 
 101. Id. at 11. 
 102. See generally Waldman, supra note 21. 
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system,103 but they can also be mobilized, as Edelman argued in the 
nondiscrimination context, as a paper trail to push back against claims of 
unfair harm from those adversely affected by the algorithm.104  
Transparency, whether in the form of source code publication or an 
explanation of the results, can throw some sunshine on an opaque process but 
is functionally unhelpful to most individuals without specialized knowledge 
or convenient evidence for a fact finder to determine compliance with the 
law.105  And keeping humans in the loop of a decision-making process offers 
an override to a mechanical process, but the extent to which the human 
element will have power depends entirely on the way the safeguard is 
implemented on the ground. 
Second, the focus on documentation and process as ends in themselves 
elevates a merely symbolic structure to evidence of actual compliance with 
the law, obscuring the underlying substantive values of fairness, equality, and 
human dignity eroded by large-scale algorithmic decision-making.  It may 
also discourage both users and policymakers from taking more robust actions 
because, after imposing procedural safeguards, they can declare their job 
done. 
Paul Butler made a similar argument about the effect of Gideon v. 
Wainwright106 on the incarceration of poor persons of color.107  By focusing 
on a procedural right to counsel, Gideon, Butler argues, obscured the “real 
crisis of indigent defense” that prison is designed for poor people and not rich 
ones.108  Ensuring some adequate representation may not be a bad idea in a 
vacuum, but it “invests the criminal justice system with a veneer” of 
legitimacy, impartiality, and protection for ordinary persons, discouraging 
anyone from digging any deeper into the systematic ways in which the 
system is stacked against the poor.109  Butler concluded that, “[o]n its face, 
the grant that Gideon provides poor people seems more than symbolic:  it 
requires states to pay for poor people to have lawyers.  But the 
implementation of Gideon suggests that the difference between symbolic and 
material rights might be more apparent than real.”110  Similarly, process-
oriented rules for reining in discriminatory algorithms could obscure 
underlying injustices and stand in the way of substantive reform. 
 
 103. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in 
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008). 
 104. For Edelman, this is an example of the “mobilization of symbolic structures” to protect 
the corporation and deny individuals their rights under the law. See EDELMAN, supra note 16, 
at 153–67. 
 105. Edelman calls this “deference.” See id. at 168–71. 
 106. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 107. See Paul Butler, Poor People Lose:  Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 
2176, 2197–98 (2013). 
 108. Id. at 2178. 
 109. Id. at 2178–79. 
 110. Id. at 2191. 
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C.  A Substantive Alternative 
Under neoliberal managerialism, which envisions a deregulated market 
with corporate actors using compliance metrics to largely police 
themselves,111 automated decision-making systems lack democratic 
legitimacy.  They are biased and discriminatory, and legal process is unlikely 
to address the underlying inequalities and power structures that threaten to 
make algorithmic systems tools of corporate and majoritarian power.112 
We need a robust, substantive approach to ensure that algorithmic systems 
meet fundamental social values other than efficiency.  To do that, we need to 
audit the code of automated systems for noncompliance with values like 
equality, nondiscrimination, dignity, privacy, and human rights.  Academic 
researchers have been doing this for some time and can be deputized to 
conduct independent sociotechnical analyses of algorithmic systems before 
and after they are used in commerce or by a government entity. 
Consider, for example, the work of Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru and 
their Gender Shades project.113  Recognizing the biases in facial recognition 
technology,114 Buolamwini and Gebru developed an approach to detect, 
classify, and evaluate the extent of bias in any automated facial analysis 
program.  They deployed their test on three commercially available gender 
facial recognition systems and found substantial disparities in 
misclassification among darker females (the most miscategorized), lighter 
females, darker males, and lighter males (the least miscategorized).115  These 
systems failed a substantive test for adherence to society’s normative values 
of nondiscrimination and equality and could, therefore, be subject to 
regulation.  Teams at Carnegie Mellon University have determined the extent 
to which privacy policies are inscrutable and incomprehensible, giving 
willing regulators ammunition to make notice-and-consent more effective.116  
 
 111. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 143–59. 
 112. Id. at 4–5 (noting that law and technology are not neutral tools and that both can either 
be “means of resisting domination or vehicles for embedding it”). 
 113. See GENDER SHADES, http://gendershades.org/ [https://perma.cc/B4LQ-99FC] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 114. See, e.g., Adam Frucci, HP Face-Tracking Webcams Don’t Recognize Black People, 
GIZMODO (Dec. 21, 2009, 10:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/hp-face-tracking-webcams-dont-
recognize-black-people-5431190 [https://perma.cc/VLQ4-QGTF]; Loren Grush, Google 
Engineer Apologizes After Photos App Tags Two Black People as Gorillas, VERGE (July 1, 
2015, 6:03 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/1/8880363/google-apologizes-photos-
app-tags-two-black-people-gorillas [https://perma.cc/27ZH-XBSF]; Adam Rose, Are Face-
Detection Cameras Racist?, TIME (Jan. 22, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/business/ 
article/0,8599,1954643,00.html [https://perma.cc/83XA-5MFW]. 
 115. See Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades:  Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING 77, 84–87 
(2018). 
 116. See, e.g., Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient:  Standardized 
Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274–
75 (2012); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies, 4 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 543, 566–67 (2008).  Despite this data, 
regulators in the United States have generally failed to take action on inconspicuous policies 
or inscrutable language without any additional corporate mischief. 
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Princeton University researchers have identified how websites use “dark 
patterns” to manipulate our behavior,117 offering policymakers the 
information necessary to trigger regulatory investigations into “unfair and 
deceptive” business practices.118  Social scientists and researchers at civil 
society organizations like the AI Now Institute and Data & Society use a 
variety of tools to analyze the social implications of algorithmic systems.119  
Technology companies should be required by law to hire independent 
technologists, social scientists, ethicists, and other experts as independent ex 
ante algorithmic auditors, much like the GDPR requires data controllers to 
hire data protection officers120 or how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires 
independent audit committees for public corporations.121  For ex post 
analyses, regulators could recruit—and hire to their staffs—similarly diverse 
experts from computer science, sociology, anthropology, and data science to 
develop their own substantive tests for algorithmic legitimacy, thereby 
raising awareness, contributing to necessary changes in design, and creating 
a robust regulatory agenda. 
The tools for this approach to legitimate algorithmic decision-making 
systems are in place now.  Independent academic experts have the expertise 
and the tools to evaluate automated systems.  Sarbanes-Oxley provides a 
model for independent expertise inside a company.  All levels of government, 
from cities to the federal government, could enact legislation that expresses 
the values society wants algorithmic decisions to reflect.  And regulators can 
recruit experts to test technological tools in contexts that both protect 
proprietary information and give outside auditors the data they need.  Then 
we can develop socially conscious algorithmic decision-making systems. 
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this Essay is that algorithmic decision-making is 
a product of the neoliberal managerial project.  Neoliberalism’s resistance to 
social justice and its emphasis on deregulated markets, economic 
opportunity, and efficiency, coupled with managerialism’s tendency to create 
 
 117. See generally Mathur et al., supra note 45. 
 118. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014) (arguing generally that the FTC’s privacy 
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COMMISSION:  PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016) (describing the origins and multiple ways the 
FTC protects the privacy of U.S. consumers). 
 119. See Initiative:  AI on the Ground, DATA & SOC’Y, https://datasociety.net/research/ai-
on-the-ground/ [https://perma.cc/B9TR-H6H2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); Research, AI NOW 
INST., https://ainowinstitute.org/research.html [https://perma.cc/3HQS-J5E4] (last visited Oct. 
6, 2019). 
 120. See GDPR, supra note 71, at 7. 
 121. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012); Listing Standards 
Relating to Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2019); Standards Relating to Listed 
Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 228–29, 240, 249, and 274).  “Independent” means not being affiliated with the company 
other than as a director or receiving any compensation other than for serving as a director. See 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301. 
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systems that emphasize efficiency and innovation over other values, 
contribute to a system that values fast, data-driven decision-making by 
machines.  Seen in this way, saying that automated decision-making 
disempowers humans would be incomplete.  It disempowers some humans 
by transforming us into statistics and bits of data.  However, algorithmic 
decision-making empowers engineers and the technology companies they 
work for because, collectively, they control the social process by which 
decision-making policy is reformulated into the code that affects whether 
ordinary individuals receive loans, get put in prison, or gain access to health 
care.  This is the apotheosis of the neoliberal vision.  Absent are normative 
social values like equality, nondiscrimination, and human rights. 
This Essay also challenges the conventional wisdom that process and 
procedure can address the gaps left by automated decision-making.  It 
proposes that regulators, assisted by independent academic experts, audit 
algorithmic decision-making code for its adherence to social values.  And it 
recommends that tools that fail independent tests should not be deployed. 
But in adding to a growing research agenda on algorithms in society, more 
work needs to be done.  Empirical work can determine the bases, if any, on 
which individuals are willing to accept the decisions of algorithms.  
Technical research is necessary to develop methodologies for interrogating 
decision-making code.  Interdisciplinary legal research could develop 
regulatory standards for determining when dark patterns are 
impermissible.122  And legal policy research should determine how best to 
structure and fund a regulatory body that can do the difficult work of ensuring 
that algorithmic decision-making systems conform to our social values. 
 
 122. Several of these are part of the author’s ongoing research, particularly the 
development of legal standards for regulating dark patterns and empirical work on popular 
perceptions of the legitimacy of automated decision-making. 
